

Message Text

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12

ACTION IO-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NEA-06 EUR-10 NSC-10 NSCE-00 PM-03

L-02 PRS-01 INR-09 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 DODE-00 RSR-01

RSC-01 /061 W

----- 069939

R 140616 Z APR 73

FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7505

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TELAVIV

USINT CAIRO

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 1368

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: UNSC, LE, IS

SUBJ: SC MEETING ON BEIRUT: LEBANESE DRAFT

1. FOLLOWING APRIL 13 MEETING OF SC, LEBANESE PASSED
DRAFT RES TO FRENCH " ON UNDERSTANDING" IT WOULD NOT RPT
NOT SHARED WITH OTHER DELS AT THIS TIME. LEBANESE REPORTEDLY
TOLD FRENCH DRAFT WOULD ONLY BE SHOWN EGYPTIANS.

2. FRENCH INFORMED UK DEL WHICH HAS IN STRICTEST
CONFIDENCE TRANSMITTED TO US

3. TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

HAVING CONSIDERED THE AGENDA CONTAINED IN DOC S/ AGENDA 1705

HAVING NOTED CONTENTS OF LETTER OF PERM REP OF LEBANON
(DOC S/10913)

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HAVING HEARD STATEMENTS OF REP OF LEBANON AND OF ISRAEL

GRIEVED AT TRAGIC LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE

GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT DETERIORATING SITUATION RESULTING
FROM VIOLATION OF SC RES' S

RECALLING ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON
OF MARCH 23, 1949 AND CEASE-FIRE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT
TO RES 233 OF 1967 AND 234 OF 1967

RECALLING ITS RES 262 (1968) 270 (AUGUST 26, 1969)
280 (MAY 19, 1970) AND 316 (JUNE 26, 1972)

1- EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN OVER AND DEPLORES ALL ACTS OF
VIOLENCE WHICH ENDANGER OR TAKE INNOCENT HUMAN LIVES

2- CONDEMNS REPEATED MILITARY ATTACKS CONDUCTED BY ISRAEL
AGAINST LEBANON AND ISRAEL'S VIOLATION OF LEBANON
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY FOR
SOUTH VIETNAM WITH KIKUCHI, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
ECONOMIC COOPERATION BUREAU, FONOFF AND SENIOR
MINISTRY OFFICIALS. ECON/MIN OPENED CONVERSATION
BY NOTING THAT HE HAD MET KIKUCHI PREVIOUS EVENING AND
SUBJECT OF IBRD INITIATIVE HAD ARISEN. HE HAD COME
AWAY FROM DISCUSSION WITH KIKUCHI WITH IMPRESSION
THAT FONOFF ENTHUSIASM FOR ESTABLISHING MULTILATERAL
AID PROGRAM FOR SVN AT THIS TIME WAS SOMEWHAT SLACKENING.
GOODMAN, AFTER OUTLINING PROPOSAL ALONG LINES REFTEL,
SAID FROM HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JAPANESE OFFICIALS
HE CONCLUDED JAPANESE WERE SERIOUS IN CONSIDERING
PROPOSAL, BUT HE THOUGHT FONOFF BELIEVED
THERE WERE TWO SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS WHICH REQUIRED
STUDY AT THIS TIME.

2. FIRST, FONOFF BELIEVES IT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF
SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF JAPANESE PUBLIC CONCERN
THAT BELIEVES AID TO SVN SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO
ALL THE PEOPLE OF SVN. IN OTHER WORDS, HOPEFULLY
AID WOULD NOT ONLY REACH PEOPLE IN AREAS UNDER
CONTROL OF GVN BUT ALSO TO PEOPLE UNDER PRG
CONTROL. (THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OF THE PRG,
ACCORDING TO GOODMAN, WAS A SEPARATE MATTER).

3. SECONDARILY, GOJ WANTS TO KNOW DETAILS OF US
THINKING ON AID TO ALL OF VIETNAM. FOR EXAMPLE,
FONOFF ENVISAGES AID AS BREAKING DOWN INTO THREE
CATEGORIES, RELIEF, B/P SUPPORT, AND DEVELOPMENT,
IN RESPECT SVN, KIKUCHI SAID THAT GOJ WOULD BE
WILLING TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN RELIEF
AND DEVELOPMENT CATEGORIES, BUT IT LOOKED TO USG
TO CARRY PRINCIPAL IF NOT ENTIRE BURDEN OF B/P
SUPPORT (SEE TOKYO 3699, PARA 7). FONOFF WOULD
LIKE TO KNOW USG VIEWS ON MATTERS SUCH AS THESE.
LATER IN CONVERSATION, SOEJIMA PICKED UP THIS
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POINT AGAIN. REFERRING TO SENATOR BROOKE' S CONVERSATION WITH FORMIN OHIRA, HE POINTED TO OHIRA' S EMPHASIS ON NEED FOR DISCUSSION WITH USG

ON AID (TOKYO 3911).

4. ECON/ MIN, REFERRING TO OUTLINE OF PROPOSED CONSORTIUM ARRANGEMENT, SAID KIKUCHI APPEARED IMPLY THAT GOJ PARTICIPATION WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON AGREEMENT OF ALL MAJOR MEMBERS OF BANK, INCLUDING SCANDINAVIANS. DID GOODMAN OBTAIN IMPRESSION JAPANESE WERE ATTEMPTING HIDE BEHIND THIS APPROACH AS METHOD OF NON- PARTICIPATION? GOODMAN REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK SO. HE THOUGHT KIKUCHI' S REFERENCE WAS TO MCNAMARA' S BELIEF THAT HE COULD ONLY PROVIDE IBRD LEADERSHIP IF THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FROM BANK MEMBERS. MCNAMARA THOUGHT THIS WOULD MEAN SUPPORT FROM USG, GOJ, SEVERAL OF MOST IMPORTANT EUROPEAN MEMBERS, AND CANADA, AS WELL AS INVOLVEMENT ADB. GOODMAN COULD ENVISAGE SITUATION IN WHICH SWEDEN, FOR EXAMPLE, MIGHT DISAGREE WITH BANK' S ROLE, BUT MAJOR MEMBERS WERE FAVORABLY INCLINED. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE THOUGHT MCNAMARA WOULD GO AHEAD AND GOJ WOULD PARTICIPATE.

5. QUESTION WAS ALSO RAISED AS TO HOW JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH NVN MIGHT AFFECT JAPANESE ROLE IN IBRD- LED CONSORTIUM FOR SVN. GOODMAN AND SOEJIMA INDICATED THAT THIS ASPECT OF SITUATION HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED IN DEPTH. THEY HAD IMPRESSION THAT IF THERE WJN CLEAR REJECTION BY NVN OF MULTILATERAL APPROACH, THEN GOJ MIGHT BE ABLE

TO GO AHEAD ON AID TO SVN. THEY ALSO HAD IMPRESSION THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FROM GOJ POINT OF VIEW THAT PROPOSED CONSORTIUM OFFER AID, AT LEAST

INITIALLY, TO BOTH SVN AND NVN.

6. GOODMAN CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT MOST USEFUL IMMEDIATE STEP THAT COULD
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BE TAKEN VIS- A- VIS THE JAPANESE WAS FOR THE AMBASSADOR TO DISCUSS USG POSITION ON AID TO INDOCHINA WITH FONMIN OHIRA BEFORE MCNAMARA' S ARRIVAL APRIL

18.

7. FOLLOWING CONVERSATION REPORTED ABOVE, ECON/ MIN HAD OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE TOPIC WITH MIKANAGI, DIRECTOR- GENERAL, ECONOMIC COOPERATION BUREAU, FONOFF AND EMBOFF WITH KIKUCHI. MIKANAGI STRESSED " PECULIAR DOMESTIC SITUATION" IN WHICH JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY HAD BEEN LEADING MOVEMENT TO ENSURE THAT AID TO SVN WOULD ALSO BE AVAILABLE TO PEOPLE IN PRG- HELD AREAS.

8. MIKANAGI ALSO SAID IF PROPOSED CONSORTIUM WOULD COVER ALL OF INDOCHINA OR BOTH VIETNAMS , THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THAT UNDER THIS UMBRELLA, SUBSTANTIAL JAPANESE AID COULD BE CHANNELED TO SVN. KIKUCHI, TOO, FOLLOWED THIS POINT, SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT INITIAL ATTITUDE OF PROPOSED CONSORTIUM SHOULD BE THAT IT WOULD BE WILLING TO ORGANIZE AID FOR BOTH SVN AND NVN. HE ALSO POINTED TO " LACK OF COMMUNICATION" BETWEEN USG AND GOJ ON AID TO VIETNAM. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PREFERABLE FOR USG AND GOJ TO HAVE HAD BILATERAL TALKS BEFORE THE IBRD HAD TAKEN THIS INITIATIVE.
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